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Focus ￿ specialization and speci￿c technology ￿ improves productivity but
leads to more dependency and opens a door for holdup problems. We ana-
lyze how organizational design and the choice of technology interact with the
allocation of ownership in minimizing the holdup problem. We ￿nd a novel
motive for job rotation: rotation reduces holdup problems in an integrated
￿rm. We also show that holdup problem in speci￿c physical capital is re-
m o v e di nt h ei n t e g r a t e d￿rm while holdups in speci￿c human capital remain.
Furthermore, ownership gives incentives to focus human capital on the ￿rm.
JEL classi￿cation: D23, L221I n t r o d u c t i o n
I nt h ep r o p e r t yr i g h t st h e o r yo ft h e￿rm ownership is the only instrument
used to minimize the holdup problems in speci￿c human capital. In Gross-
man and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) ownership gives power and
power improves incentives. While with reputation eﬀects (Baker, Gibbons
and Murphy (2002) and Halonen (2002)) or applying a diﬀerent bargain-
ing model (Chiu (1998) and De Meza and Lockwood (1998)) ownership can
demotivate.
The point of this paper is that, in addition to ownership, organizational
design can aﬀect the holdups. When the agents specialize, they become in-
dispensable because nobody else can perform their task. That gives holdup
power to the agents. If the holdup problems are too great, it is better for
the agents to rotate between tasks. Rotation removes the holdup power of
the specialized agent because other agents are able to perform the same task.
That is the bene￿t of rotation. Rotation also makes the agents less produc-
tive for a given investment in human capital because they are unfocused.1
This is the cost of rotation. Organizational design and ownership interact in
interesting ways in our model as illustrated in the following example.
Consider an IT ￿rm with two programmers, 1 and 2. A typical project
of developing a programme consists of two tasks: algorithmic design (task
A) and graphic design (task B). Programmer 1 can specialize in one task,
say algorithmic design, and learn the skills to develop the algorithms that
run the programme. Alternatively he can learn the skills to complete the
whole project, algorithmic and graphic design, on his own.2 We call this
rotation. Suppose it is eﬃcient for each programmer to specialize in one task.
Organizational design in this example is the choice between specialization and
rotation.
Our interest is in how organizational design interacts with ownership.
Suppose programmer 1 owns the integrated ￿rm where programmer 2 is his
1There can be other bene￿ts to rotation, e.g. learning spillovers, but in this paper we
analyze a situation where specialization is ￿rst best and there is an interesting trade-oﬀ.
2Note that the skills required to develop the programme are to a large extent ￿rm-
speci￿c. The programmers need to learn to work together so that the two parts of the
programme ￿t together. Even more importantly programming requires a good knowledge
of this particular ￿rm￿s customers. About 50 per cent of programming is understanding
the application. For example the ￿rm could be developing a programme to automate
production of plastic. This requires understanding of the customer￿s technology and
products and what can be diﬃcult in the production process.
1employee. Suppose programmer 1 specializes in algorithms and programmer
2 in graphics. Specialization gives holdup power to programmer 2 because
he is the only person who can design graphics and the project cannot be
completed without him. Programmer 1 underinvests in algorithmic skills
because programmer 2 expropriates part of the marginal value of his skills.
Programmer 1 therefore implements rotation for his ￿rm.3 Rotation removes
the holdup power of his employee because the owner is able to complete both
parts of the project.4 Therefore the owner has good incentives in investing
in human capital. But now the programmers are unfocused due to rotation
and given investments are less valuable than with specialization.
Then consider a situation where there are two small ￿rms (nonintegra-
tion): programmer 1 owns a ￿rm that writes the algorithms for the pro-
gramme and sells it to a ￿rm owned by programmer 2. Programmer 2
completes the project with graphics and sells it to the ￿nal customer. Under
nonintegration the programmers naturally specialize in one task and task
allocation is eﬃcient. This is how organizational design and ownership in-
teract: under integration an ineﬃcient task allocation is chosen to improve
the owner￿s bargaining position while under nonintegration the programmers
eﬃciently specialize.
If tasks A and B are highly complementary to the degree that the ￿rm
owned by programmer 2 is the only customer for programmer 1￿s ￿rm which
in turn is the only supplier for 2￿s ￿rm, then nonintegration results in serious
holdup problems. These holdup problems can be avoided if both tasks are
performed in one integrated ￿rm. This result is well known. What we add is
that this economy comes at the cost of ineﬃcient task allocation. Integrated
￿rm is designed to give power to the owner rather than to employ the best5
production methods.
We ￿nd that the optimal size of the ￿rm is a balance between two counter-
acting forces. When the returns to specialization are signi￿cant a fragmented
3An alternative way to reduce the employee￿s holdup power under specialization is to
hire another employee who would also specialize in B. This would reduce the owner￿s
holdup problem but would not eliminate it since the two employees can form a coalition
and hold up the owner. We are analyzing a relatively small ￿rm where hiring an additional
employee to provide internal competition is not feasible.
4It is not necessary that he actually performs both tasks when the ￿rm is working on
a project but the point is that he would be able to do that.
5Absent holdup problems.
2ownership structure with two small ￿r m si so p t i m a l . T h i sc r e a t e sal a r g e r
class of owning agents who have the right incentives for specialization. While
under concentrated ownership structure the worker is not allowed to obtain
the power that specialization gives him. On the other hand, when economies
of scope or scale are much more important than returns to specialization,
the optimal ￿rm size is large. Separating very complementary assets would
not give power to anybody and the holdup problems would be very severe.
Then it is better to concentrate ownership in one agent￿s hands. Having one
large ￿rm would provide the best incentives for human capital investments ￿
even if it comes at a cost of ineﬃcient task allocation, namely rotation of the
workers. Accordingly, we have identi￿ed a new cost of integration:i n e ﬃcient
organizational design in an integrated ￿rm.
Economies of scope or scale can depend on the technology choice of
the ￿rms. Technology choice therefore also aﬀects the power relationships.
Choosing a speci￿c technology and gearing the assets to work together makes
them more productive ￿ and more dependent on each other (depending on
the ownership structure). While a general technology enables the assets to
trade with many equally good trading partners therefore removing the holdup
problems (depending on the ownership structure). We further analyze two
other versions of our model. In the second version we endogenize technology
choice in addition to organizational design. In the third version only the
technology choice is endogenous.
In our example the programmers can now choose to produce general pack-
ages that can be used by many customers, e.g. a mathematics package con-
sisting of various algorithms and a graphic library. Alternatively they can
choose to work on a speci￿c project and tailor the algorithms and graphics for
this project. The algorithms and graphics designed for this speci￿cp r o j e c t
have no other use. While the results on the technology choice are familiar on
their own, it is the interaction with organizational design that is interesting
in this version of the model.
Suppose it is ￿rst best for the programmers to work on the speci￿c
project.6 We ￿nd that nonintegration gives good incentives for task al-
location but poor incentives for technology choice. Integration interestingly
has the opposite properties and gives good incentives for technology choice
6General technology can be eﬃcient in certain situations as it maximizes the number
of customers but here we focus on a case where speci￿c technology is eﬃcient, e.g. there
is a customer who cannot use general packages but needs a tailor-made project which is
very valuable.
3but poor incentives for task allocation. Therefore nonintegration is optimal
when it is important to implement the eﬃcient task allocation, that is when
the returns to specialization are large relative to the returns to the speci￿c
technology. While integration is optimal when the returns to the speci￿c
technology are relatively large.
In the third version of the model only the technology choice is endoge-
nous. This is the relevant case for example when there is a programming
task and an engineering task, which require so diﬀerent basic education that
rotation is not an option. We analyze this version so that we can ￿nd the
general message from our three models. On their own the results of this ver-
sion are well known. Under nonintegration the agents choose the ineﬃcient
general technology to improve their bargaining positions and in fact remove
the holdup problem. While under integration the eﬃcient speci￿ct e c h n o l o g y
is chosen but the agents are subject to holdups. If the speci￿ct e c h n o l o g yi s
much more productive than the general one, integration is optimal.
There are two results that arise in all three versions of the model. The
￿rst general message of this paper is that speci￿c technology is chosen under
integration. This result provides clari￿cation for the Hart-Williamson de-
bate. Hart (1995, 27-28) criticizes the transaction cost theory for assuming
that holdup problems are reduced in an integrated ￿rm. When we analyze
technology choice ￿ which a lot of Williamson￿s analysis is about ￿ holdup
problem is indeed eliminated in the integrated ￿rm. The reason is not that
the agents become less opportunistic but because choosing a speci￿c technol-
ogy does not make the owner vulnerable as he owns both assets. While Hart
analyzes investments in speci￿c human capital for which holdup behaviour
does not disappear in the integrated ￿rm, it just changes.
The second general message is that the owner always focuses his human
capital inside the ￿rm. The workers may gear their skills to some extent
outside the focus of the ￿rm to improve their bargaining position.7 The
owner of the ￿rm faces diﬀerent incentives and cannot gain anything from
learning outside skills. Ownership gives the incentives to focus on the ￿rm.
Our model builds on Hart and Moore (1990). Two important determi-
nants for the optimal ownership structure in their paper are the importance
of an agent as a trading partner and the degree of complementarity between
the assets. Our point is that these determinants can be endogenous, the
￿rst depending on the organizational design and the second on the choice of
7Our model analyzes only asset-speci￿c investments.
4technology.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) is closely related, in particular their case of
complementary investments. Two agents each specializing in one task obtain
too much holdup power and the resulting incentives are poor. Their solution
to the holdup problem is to allow access to only one agent who performs both
tasks. Our solution is for each agent to rotate. Their solution applies when
the scale of production is relatively small so that it is indeed feasible for one
skilled agent to perform both tasks.
Holmstr￿m and Milgrom (1994) analyze ownership and job design as com-
plementary instruments motivating the workers and focus on the interactions
arising from the cost function. In their paper ownership gives the same re-
turns whatever the job design while the point of this paper is that job design
aﬀects the bargaining outcome within the ￿rm.
Eliminating holdup problems is not the only motivation for job rotation.
Rotation improves the ￿rm￿s ability to deal with change (Koike (1984), Aoki
(1986)). There can be learning spillovers between tasks arising either from
intertask learning (Lindbeck and Snower (2000)) or knowledge transfer be-
tween workers (Lazear (1998), 328-330). Workers may have a preference for
a variety of tasks (Cosgel and Miceli (1999)). To our knowledge the power
reduction motive for job rotation is novel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we relate our
work to the classical literature on the theory of the ￿rm. Section 3 introduces
our model of ownership and organizational design. Section 4 analyzes the in-
centives for organizational design and investments in human capital under
various ownership structures while Section 5 derives the optimal ownership
structure. Section 6 extends the analysis to the case where both organiza-
tional design and technology are endogenous while in Section 7 we examine
the case where only technology is endogenous. Section 8 discusses the general
message emerging from the three versions of the model. The following two
sections show that our assumptions about symmetric task allocation (Section
9) and contractible organizational design and technology (Section 10) are not
critical. Section 11 concludes.
2 Related literature
In this section we relate our work to the classical literature on the theory of
the ￿rm.
52.1 Marglin vs. Williamson
Adam Smith compares two production modes in pinmaking: specialization
and separate crafting of each individual pin. He concludes that there are
signi￿cant returns to specialization. This has been interpreted as a rationale
for the rise of capitalist ￿rm. Marglin (1974) points out that there is a
third production mode where each worker proceeds from task to task ￿rst
drawing out enough wire for thousands of pins, then straightening it etc.
He proposes that this is as eﬃcient as specialization of each worker in one
task since time will not be lost in constantly switching between tasks (and
he does not acknowledge the other reasons for returns to specialization).
Marglin interprets this as a nonhierarchical organization of production. Since
according to him the capitalist and nonhierarchical organizations are equally
eﬃcient specialization ￿was introduced so that capitalist got himself a larger
share of the pie at the expense of the worker￿ ￿ not for eﬃciency reasons.
However, these alternative production modes could be implemented under
various ownership structures. Clearly the separate crafting of each individual
pin is ineﬃcient. Marglin￿s third production mode is in fact a description of
rotation. Then there is a choice between specialization and rotation. Spe-
cialization does not imply a capitalist mode but could be (and indeed in our
model is) implemented in the entrepreneurial mode (nonintegration) where
each worker is a boss of his own. According to Marglin rotation would be
chosen in nonhierarchical organizations and specialization in capitalist ￿rms.
Our model gives exactly the opposite prediction. However, our model is
consistent with Marglin in that the capitalist organization (integration) is
designed to give a larger share of the pie to the capitalist (choice of rotation
to weaken workers￿ bargaining power) ￿ but in the same time the capitalist
￿rm arises only when it is eﬃcient.
Williamson (1985, Ch. 9) takes the opposite view to Marglin and proposes
that capitalist authority relation is the most eﬃcient mode. His federated
entrepreneurial mode is like our nonintegration and his capitalist authority
relation is like our integration. Specialization is assumed to occur for both
modes and there is no discussion of the power that the specialized workers
obtain in the capitalist mode.
The point of this paper is that organizational design is endogenous. Spe-
cialization does not imply a capitalist ￿rm and rotation does not imply a
nonhierarchical ￿rm.
It should be noted that we have a rather special de￿nition of specializa-
6tion. Under specialization only one agent knows how to perform a particular
task and therefore gains power. Specialization often refers to dividing a task
into smaller tasks which can be performed by several agents. In such a sit-
uation there is competition between agents and specialization does not give
much power to a single agent (though as a group they have power). The
stylized fact is that this type of specialization occurs in large capitalist ￿rms
as per Marglin and Williamson. Our analysis applies when specialization is
limited by the extent of the market (small ￿rms where it is not feasible for
many workers to specialize in the same task).
2.2 Grocers and employees
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) raised the question why an employee would ac-
cept employer￿s authority any more than a grocer would listen to a consumer.
The worst sanction in both cases is ￿ring. The property rights theory shows
that the diﬀerence is that the grocer walks away with his asset while an em-
ployee leaves without any assets. This diﬀerence gives the employer leverage
(Hart (1995), p. 58).
In this paper there is a further diﬀerence. An employee can be ￿red also
ex ante if he does not accept the task allocation. While a grocer can only be
￿red ex post. Customer can either buy from the grocer or not but he does not
have a say for the organizational design in the grocery. While an employer has
authority in task allocation although he cannot tell the employee how hard
to work on a given task. Therefore the employee accepts a task allocation
that does not violate his individual rationality constraint (like Simon￿s (1951)
area of acceptance). This idea is related to Holmstr￿m￿s (1999) view of the
￿rm as an island economy where the CEO has the power to de￿ne the rules
of the game.
2.3 Empirical literature
There is a large empirical literature on transaction cost theory (for a survey
see Shelanski and Klein (1995)) examining how the make or buy decision
depends on the asset speci￿city. The hypothesis is that integration is ob-
served for high asset speci￿city and nonintegration for low asset speci￿city.
This paper points out a possible endogenity problem in these regressions that
leads to biased estimators. When the ￿rm has a choice between speci￿ca n d
general technology, the degree of asset speci￿city is indeed not exogenous.
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We analyze a setup where there are two agents, 1 and 2, and two assets,
a1 and a2. Ex ante the agents learn to operate the assets. The agents can
either specialize (agent i learns to use only ai) or rotate (each agent learns
to use both assets). We denote the level of investment in human capital of




i =1 ,2 where I>0.
Organizational design determines whether this is an investment to learn to
use both assets or only one.
Our model builds on Hart and Moore (1990). We simplify their setting
by having two agents and two assets and endogenize organizational design in
their framework.8
The cost of the investment is c(Ii) a n di sa s s u m e dt oh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g
standard properties.
Assumption 1. c(0) = 0.cis twice diﬀerentiable. c0(Ii) > 0 and c00 (Ii) >




, with limIi→0 c0 (Ii)=0and limIi→I c0 (Ii)=∞.
Ex post production and trade occur. The value of production depends on
which agent(s) are involved and on which assets they are using. The value of
production depends also on organizational design and on the human capital
of the included agents. Under rotation a coalition S of agents with a set of
assets A and given investments I =( I1,I 2) can generate a value v(S,A | I).
While under specialization a value V (S,A;α | I) can be obtained, where
α ≥ 1. Parameter α is a measure of the returns to specialization; how much
higher value the specialized agents can generate for given investments.
In what follows we simplify notation by not explicitly writing the invest-
ments in the value functions: v(S,A | I) ≡ v(S,A) and V (S,A;α | I) ≡
V (S,A;α). We make the following assumptions about the value function
under specialization.




In other words, when there are no returns to specialization given in-
vestments generate the same value under both rotation and specialization.
8In Hart and Moore (1990) organizational design (the degree of indispensability of an
agent) is exogenous.
8Furthermore, the value of production under specialization is increasing in the
returns to specialization.
We further make the following assumptions about the marginal values of
investments. We adopt notation ∂
∂Iiv (S,A) ≡ vi (S,A) and ∂
∂IiV (S,A;α) ≡
V i (S,A;α).A \ai denotes a set of assets that does not include ai.
Assumption 3. UnderspecializationVi (S,A\ai;α)=0and V i (i,{a1,a 2};α)=
V i (i,{ai};α).
Assumption 4. Underrotationvi (S,∅)=0and vi(i,{a1,a 2})=vi (12,{a1,a 2}).
Assumption 5. V (i,∅;α)=v(i,∅).
We assume that the investments are asset speci￿c, that is the skills have
no value unless the agent has access to the relevant asset/s. This explains
the ￿rst part of Assumptions 3 and 4 and Assumption 5. Assumption 3
further says that when the agents specialize the marginal value of agent
i￿s investment without the contribution of agent j i st h es a m ew h e t h e rh e
has or has not access to asset aj. Agent i￿s skills are geared to operating
asset ai only and therefore aj does not enhance the value of his skills at the
margin. In other words, specialization makes agent j indispensable to aj.
While according to Assumption 4 under rotation the marginal value of i￿s
investment is not enhanced by agent j joining the coalition. Agent i knows
how to operate both assets and therefore j is not important at the margin.
In other words, rotation makes the agents dispensable.
Additionally we make the following assumptions as in Hart and Moore
(1990). The assumptions are for simplicity written only for v(S,A) but also
V (S,A;α) is assumed to have the same properties.
Assumption 6. v(S,A) ≥ 0 and v (∅,A)=0 .v(S,A) is twice differentiable




.v(S,A) is concave in I.
Assumption 7. vi(S,A | I)=0if i / ∈ S.
Assumption 8. ∂
∂Ijvi (S,A | I) ≥ 0 for j 6= i.
Assumption 9. For all subsets S0 ⊆ S, A0 ⊆ A, v (S,A) ≥ v(S0,A 0)+
v(S\S0,A\A0).
9Assumption 10. For all subsets S0 ⊆ S, A0 ⊆ A, vi (S,A) ≥ vi (S0,A 0).
Assumption 6 gives the standard properties for the value function (in-
creasing and concave) taking into account that agent i￿s investment does not
aﬀect the value of all coalitions. Assumption 7 follows on this and states that
agent i￿s investment increases the value of only those coalitions of which he is
a member. According to Assumption 8 the agents￿ investments are (weakly)
complementary. Assumption 9 ensures that it is ex post eﬃcient for the
agents to produce together with both assets. According to Assumption 10
the marginal value of investment is nondecreasing in the number of agents
and assets in the coalition.
One ￿nal assumption:
Assumption 11. v(12,{a1,a 2}|I1 = I0,I 2 = I00)=v(12,{a1,a 2}|I1 = I00,I 2 = I0),
v(1,{a1,a 2}|I1 = I0)=v (2,{a1,a 2}|I2 = I0),v(1,{a1}|I1 = I0)=
v(2,{a2}|I2 = I0)
Assumption 11 says that the investments enter symmetrically in the value
functions. Since also the cost functions are symmetric, the agents are iden-
tical.
3.1 Contracts
We assume that ex ante contracts can only be written on the ownership
structure and organizational design. (Section 10 shows that our results are
robust to noncontractible organizational design.) As is standard in this lit-
erature investments in human capital are assumed to be observable for the
agents but not veri￿able in courts. Furthermore contracts on trade can only
be written ex post.
The ex ante contract determines the ownership structure and organiza-
tional design. The assets can be either nonintegrated (1 owns a1 and 2 owns
a2) or integrated (one agent owns both assets). The agents either specialize in
operating one asset or rotate between the assets.9 The agents have symmetric
i n f o r m a t i o na n dt h e r e f o r es u i t a b l et r a n s f e rp a y m e n t se xa n t eg u a r a n t e et h a t
a joint surplus maximizing ownership structure and organizational design are
chosen.
9In the main model we do not allow for one agent to specialize and the other agent to
rotate. See Section 9 for discussion of asymmetric task allocation.
10The timing of the model is illustrated in Figure 1. Ex ante the agents write
a contract on the ownership structure and organizational design. Then the
agents choose their investments in human capital noncooperatively. Ex post
production occurs and spot contracts on trade are negotiated. We assume
that the agents divide the gains from trade according to Nash bargaining.
3.2 First best
The ￿rst best is for each agent to specialize in one task and to choose the




i ) i =1 ,2 (1)
Because investments are not contractible they will be chosen noncoopera-
tively and typically ￿r s tb e s td o e sn o to b t a i n .O u ra i mi st o￿nd an owner-
ship structure and organizational design that give second best incentives for
human capital investments.
3.3 Technology
Technology is one of the driving forces behind our results. We now work out
some basic properties of the value functions with respect to the technology.
In our model the assets can be either vertically or horizontally related and to
ease the discussion we de￿ne a concept of joint economies to describe either
economies of scale or scope. When there are no joint economies (constant
returns to scale or no economies of scope) we have10:
v(12,{a1,a 2})=v(1,{a1})+v(2,{a2}). (2)
Equation (2) implies that the marginal value of investment is the same
whether the assets are used together or separately:
v
i(12,{a1,a 2})=v
i (i,{ai}) i =1 ,2. (3)
While with extreme joint economies the assets are useless separately:
v(1,{a1})+v(2,{a2})=0 (4)
and therefore the marginal value of investment is zero with only one asset:
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i (i,{ai})=0 i =1 ,2. (5)
For the intermediate case of some joint economies we have:
v(12,{a1,a 2}) >v(1,{a1})+v (2,{a2}) > 0. (6)
We assume that in this case also the marginal value of investment is inter-
mediate:
v
i (12,{a1,a 2}) >v
i (i,{ai}) > 0 i =1 ,2. (7)
We introduce a parameter µ to measure the joint economies, µ ∈ [0,1].
µ =0denotes extreme joint economies so that vi (i,{ai})=0while µ =1
stands for no joint economies and vi (i,{ai})=vi(12,{a1,a 2}). The lower is
µ, the higher the degree of joint economies. The degree of joint economies is
one of the driving forces in our model.
4 Organizational design and choice of invest-
ments
We start by analyzing how the incentives to invest depend on the organi-
zational design and the ownership structure. This allows us to determine
whether specialization or rotation will be chosen under a given ownership
structure. Section 5 follows by examining the optimal ownership structure.
4.1 Integration
Suppose agent 1 owns both assets. What are the agents￿ incentives to in-
vest under specialization and rotation? When we know the answer to this
question we can determine whether specialization or rotation will be chosen
under integration.
We start the analysis from specialization, i.e. agent i learns to operate
only asset ai,i=1 ,2 . The default payoﬀs are important in determining the
bargaining outcome. In this case agent 1￿s default payoﬀ is V (1,{a1,a 2};α),
the value she can generate with the assets she owns but without the contri-
bution of agent 2. While agent 2￿s default payoﬀ is V (2,∅;α);if the agents
12split 2 does not have access to the assets since he does not own them. The








[V (12,{a1,a 2};α) − V (1,{a1,a 2};α)+V (2,∅;α)] − c(I2) (9)
Each agent chooses investment noncooperatively foreseeing the outcome









1 (1,{a1,a 2};α) − c
0 (I1)=0 (10)
Under specialization the second asset does not enhance the marginal value
of 1￿s investment since she does not know how to operate it (Assumption 3)








1 (1,{a1};α) − c
0 (I1)=0 (11)




2 (12,{a1,a 2};α) − c
0 (I2)=0 (12)
Each agent foresees that part of the surplus he generates by his investment
is expropriated in ex post bargaining while he pays the full cost of investment.
Therefore underinvestment (holdup) typically arises. Agent 2 receives only
half of the marginal return on his investment and therefore underinvests
signi￿cantly. Agent 1￿s incentives depend on the degree of joint economies.
When joint economies are very strong so that V 1 (1,{a1};α)=0 , ownership
does not improve incentives at all since specialization gives so much power to
the worker. Ownership of the second asset does not increase the value of the
owner￿s skills since she cannot operate the second asset. Ownership of the
￿rst asset does not enhance agent 1￿s incentives either since in this case one
asset is useless without the other. While when there are no joint economies
(V 1 (1,{a1};α)=V 1 (12,{a1,a 2};α)) the owner receives the full marginal
return on her investment and therefore chooses ￿rst best investment. When
13the productivity of asset a1 is independent of a2, the worker has no power over
the owner￿s skills. Therefore the weaker are the joint economies, the better
are the owner￿s incentives because the worker￿s holdup power is decreased.
We then analyze rotation, i.e. each agent learns to operate both assets.
The payoﬀs are given by equations (8) and (9) by setting α =1and the








1 (1,{a1,a 2}) − c
0 (I1)=0 (13)
Since agent 1 has the skills to operate both assets, agent 2 is dispensable
(Assumption 4) and (13) is equivalent to:
v
1 (12,{a1,a 2}) − c
0 (I1)=0 (14)




2 (12,{a1,a 2}) − c
0 (I2)=0 (15)
The owner can operate both assets and therefore the marginal value of
her investment does not depend on whether or not the worker is in the same
coalition. The owner has all the power and chooses eﬃcient investment for
rotation,t h ei n e ﬃcient task allocation. The worker has to share the value of
his investment 50:50 with the owner to gain access to the assets whether he
has specialized or rotated and therefore faces a signi￿cant holdup.
Above we have analyzed the incentives to invest in speci￿c human capital
for a given task allocation. Moving one step backward we now examine
optimal organizational design.
The bene￿t of specialization is that given investments have higher value.
The cost of specialization is that it gives power to the worker and he can
hold up the owner. The owner￿s incentives are accordingly diluted. The
stronger are the joint economies, the more power the worker obtains. This
is because one asset in more dependent on the other and only the worker
knows how to operate the second asset. This tradeoﬀ determines the choice
of task allocation under integration.
Proposition 1 There exists b α such that under integration specialization is
chosen if and only if α ≥ b α. The greater is the degree of joint economies, the
higher is b α.
11Remember that V (S,A;α)=v(S,A) if and only if α =1 .
14Proof. The agents contract on the joint surplus maximizing task allocation.
Denote the joint surplus under integration and specialization by JI,S and
with rotation JI,R.
Under specialization ∂Ii/∂α > 0 for i =1 ,2 (equations (11) and (12))
and limα→∞ Ii = I by Assumption 1. Therefore the investment costs are
￿nite and limα→∞ JI,S = ∞. Clearly JI,S >J I,R in the limit.
If α =1there is no bene￿t to specialization, only the cost of lower
incentives for the owner, equations (11) and (14), (and there is no cost either
if there are no joint economies). Therefore JI,S ≤ JI,R for α =1 .
By continuity there exists a α = b α ≥ 1 such that JI,R = JI,S. This proves

























To increase JI,S so that (16) is satis￿ed requires a higher α. This proves the
second part of Proposition 1.
When α is very large, the returns to specialization are signi￿cant. Even
if specialization gives a lot of power to the worker the value of specialized
skills is so large that specialization will be chosen. While when α is close to
one, the returns to specialization are negligible. Specialization would only
give power to the worker without any counteracting gain. Clearly the agents
then choose rotation. This is the intuition for the ￿rst part of Proposition 1:
specialization is chosen for high α.
The second part of Proposition 1 states that the weaker are the joint
economies, the smaller have the returns to specialization be for specialization
to be chosen. If there are no joint economies, specialization does not give any
power to the worker. Since there is no cost, specialization is chosen for any α.
When joint economies are very strong, specialization gives a lot of power to
15t h ew o r k e r .R e t u r n st os p e c i a l i z a t i o nh a v et ob es i g n i ￿cant for specialization
to pay.
4.2 Nonintegration
Now suppose the assets are nonintegrated. What are the agents￿ incentives
when they specialize?
Under nonintegration and specialization agent i￿s default payoﬀ is V (i,{ai};α),
t h ev a l u eh ec a ng e n e r a t ew i t ht h ea s s e th eo w n s . T h ea g e n t s ￿p a y o ﬀsa n d












i (i,{ai};α) − c
0 (Ii)=0for i =1 ,2 (19)
The incentives depend on the degree of joint economies. When there are
no joint economies (V i (i,{ai};α)=V i (12,{a1,a 2};α)) the agents have ￿rst
best incentives. While with extreme joint economies (V i(i,{ai};α)=0 )the
agents receive only half of the marginal return on their investment at the
margin. The holdup problems are severe since the ￿rms are very dependent
on each other. This shows that under nonintegration and specialization the
agents￿ incentives are the worse, the stronger are the joint economies.
What remains to be analyzed is rotation. By de￿nition rotation means
that agent i learns to operate the asset she owns, ai, and additionally acquires
skills to operate aj owned by agent j. This sounds like a strange arragement
and indeed in equilibrium it is never chosen. Rotation would not improve the
agents￿ bargaining position. If the agents fail to reach an agreement, each
agent has access only to the asset she owns and that value does not depend on
whether she could operate the other asset. Therefore with rotation equations
(18) and (19) apply with α set equal to one.
Since there is no cost of specialization it is clear that:
Proposition 2 Under nonintegration the agents will specialize.
165 Optimal ownership structure
In Section 4 we analyzed organizational design and investments for a given
ownership structure. We now examine the optimal ownership structure.
Let us start by analyzing the ownership structures under specialization.
Comparing equations (11), (12) and (19) we see that agent 1￿s incentives are
the same in both structures while agent 2￿s investment is greater under non-
integration. Therefore given specialization nonintegration dominates. The
second asset does not improve agent 1￿s incentives under integration since she
cannot operate that asset ￿ while allocating that asset to agent 2 (noninte-
gration) improves 2￿s incentives. Accordingly the agents would never choose
integration if they want to implement specialization.
We know from Propositions 1 and 2 that rotation is only ever chosen
under integration. Above we have shown that given specialization nonin-
tegration dominates. Therefore when we choose ownership structure and
organizational design pair optimally we only need to compare nonintegration
with specialization and integration with rotation.
To make the comparison clear we rewrite the incentives for human capital
investments. Under integration and rotation we have:
v





2 (12,{a1,a 2}) − c
0 (I2)=0 (21)








i (i,{ai};α) − c
0 (Ii)=0 for i =1 ,2
(22)
The bene￿t of integration is that agent 1￿s holdup problem is removed.
The cost of integration is that rotation will be chosen and agent 2 has worse
incentives. We have identi￿ed a new cost of integration:i n e ﬃcient organiza-
tional design. Integrated ￿rm is designed to give power to the owner rather
than to employ the best12 production methods.
The optimal ownership structure depends on both α and µ. When there
are no joint economies (µ =1and V i(i,{ai};α)=V i (12,{a1,a 2};α)) ￿rst
12Absent power problems.
17best obtains under nonintegration and therefore nonintegration is optimal
for any α.
With extreme joint economies (µ =0and V i (i,{ai};α)=0 )the agents
are very dependent on each other under nonintegration and the holdup prob-
lems are severe. While under integration the owner receives the full marginal
return on her investment but given investments have a lower value under
rotation. Then the optimal ownership structure depends on α.13 When α is
close to one the returns to specialization are negligible. Integration dominates
because agent 1 has better incentives and agent 2 has no worse incentives.
While when α is large there are signi￿cant returns to specialization and the
ownership structure is chosen to implement eﬃcient task allocation. Nonin-
tegration is optimal even it results in higher holdup for agent 1.14
Proposition 3 shows how the optimal ownership structure depends on the
returns to specialization and on the degree of joint economies.
Proposition 3 There exists e α such that the optimal ownership structure is
(i) integration (and rotation) if and only if α<e α,
(ii) nonintegration (and specialization) if and only if α ≥ e α.
e α is increasing in the degree of joint economies.
Proof. Denote the joint surplus under nonintegration and specialization by
JNI,S.
For α =1and µ =0JI,R >J NI,S. Agent 1 has higher incentives under
integration ((20) vs. (22)) and agent 2￿s incentives are the same ((21) vs.
(22)). For α =1and µ =1JI,R <J NI,S since ￿rst best obtains under
nonintegration while under integration the worker is subject to a holdup.
Since JI,R does not depend on µ and ∂JNI,S/∂µ > 0 (from equation (22)) by
continuity there exists a µ = µ0, where 0 <µ 0 < 1, for which JI,R = JNI,S at
α =1 .
From equation (22) it is clear that limα→∞ JNI,S = ∞.J I,R/∂α =0 .
Therefore for µ ≥ µ0 JNI,S ≥ JI,R for all α ≥ 1.
13In Hart and Moore (1990) integration is optimal for µ =0 . The result changes when
organizational design is endogenous.
14Note that agent 1￿s investment may be greater under nonintegration than under in-
tegration even under integration agent 1 is not subject to a holdup. With specialization
α aﬀects the marginal value of the investment and if α is large enough agent 1￿s invest-
ment will be greater under nonintegration than under integration. Agent 2￿s investment
is always greater under nonintegration.





When the joint economies become stronger (lower µ) JNI,S decreases. To
increase JNI,S so that (23) is restored requires a higher α. This explains why
∂e α
∂µ < 0.
The optimal ownership structure depends on the relative importance of
the returns to specialization and the degree of joint economies. When the
returns to specialization are signi￿cant fragmented ownership structure with
two small ￿rms is optimal. This creates two owners who have the right
incentives for specialization. While when the joint economies are much more
important than the returns to specialization, it is optimal to have one large
￿rm. Separating very complementary assets would not give power to anybody
and holdup problems would be severe under nonintegration. Bringing the
assets under common ownership minimizes the holdup problems as in Hart
and Moore (1990). Our contribution is to identify a new cost of integration:
ineﬃcient organizational design. In the integrated ￿rm the agents rotate so
that the owner￿s holdup problem is minimized.
It is interesting to note that the returns to specialization are a property
of human capital while the joint economies relate to the physical capital. We
can restate our results by saying that when the emphasis is on human capital,
entrepreneurship emerges while dominant physical capital properties lead to
a large integrated ￿rm.
In equilibrium the scope of the agent￿s human capital is as wide as the
scope of the ￿r m .I na ni n t e g r a t e d￿rm the agents rotate and learn to operate
both assets of the ￿rm. While in a nonintegrated ￿rm the agent specializes
in operating the only asset of the ￿rm.
6 Choice of technology and organizational de-
sign
The degree of joint economies was one of the driving forces in the previous
analysis. The agents can often determine the degree of joint economies by
19their technology choice. With a speci￿c technology the assets are geared to be
used together and a1 is the only trading partner for a2. While with a general
technology there are many equally good trading partners. For example a
software developer can design a program to tailor it for the speci￿c needs of
one company or sell it as packaged software suitable for numerous customers.
The case of no joint economies is equivalent to the general technology and
extreme joint economies are equivalent to the speci￿c technology.
In this section we endogenize also the technology choice and analyze its
interaction with organizational design.
We have four combinations of technology and task allocation and there-
fore four productions functions. They are:
v(S,A) with rotation and general technology
e v(S,A;α) with specialization and general technology
b v(S,A;β) with rotation and speci￿ct e c h n o l o g y
v (S,A;α,β) with specialization and speci￿c technology
When asset a1 is geared to asset a2 the assets are more productive together
compared to the case where the assets have a general technology. Parame-
ter β is a measure of the returns to the speci￿c technology,β≥ 1.W i t h
the speci￿c technology the assets can only be used together and therefore
b v(i,{ai};β)=v(i,{ai};α,β)=0 .
All the productions functions are assumed to satisfy Assumptions 6-11.
The equivalent of Assumption 2 is now:
Assumption 2’. v(S,A)=e v(S,A;α) if and only if α =1 .v (S,A)=
b v(S,A;β) if and only if β =1 . e v(S,A;α)=v(S,A;α,β) if and only if
β =1 . b v(S,A;β)=v(S,A;α,β) if and only if α =1 . ∂e v
∂α > 0, ∂b v
∂β > 0,
∂v
∂α > 0, ∂v
∂β > 0 and ∂2v
∂α∂β ≥ 0 for all S 6= ∅and A 6= ∅.
Furthermore the production functions with rotation, v (S,A) and b v (S,A;β),
are assumed to satisfy the properties in Assumption 4 and the production
functions with specialization, e v (S,A;α) and v(S,A;α,β), are assumed to
20ful￿ll Assumption 3. Finally, the production functions with general technol-
ogy, v(S,A) and e v(S,A;α), are assumed to have the property equivalent
to no joint economies: vi (i,{ai})=vi(12,{a1,a 2}) and e vi (i,{ai};α)=
e vi(12,{a1,a 2};α).
The detailed analysis can be found in the Appendix. Here we report our
main results and the intuition behind them.
Since we have two technologies, two organizational designs and two own-
ership structures we have 8 structures to compare. We show in the Appendix
that only four structures are relevant, others are dominated. The relevant
structures are given below.
(i) Specialization and speci￿c technology under nonintegration or inte-




i(12,{a1,a 2};α,β) − c
0 (Ii)=0 for i =1 ,2 (24)
There is maximal holdup under nonintegration since the assets have a speci￿c
technology and the ￿rms are fully dependent on each other. Also under
integration ownership does not give any power since the owner has specialized
in operating one asset which is useless without the second asset. Therefore
with specialization and speci￿c technology the holdup problem is maximal
whatever the ownership structure.
(ii) Specialization and general technology under nonintegration
e v
i (12,{a1,a 2};α) − c
0(Ii)=0 for i =1 ,2 (25)
Since the assets have a general technology, the nonintegrated ￿rms are fully
independent and the holdup problem is removed.
(iii) Rotation and speci￿c technology under integration
b v





2 (12,{a1,a 2};β) − c
0 (I2)=0 (27)
Rotation makes the worker dispensable under integration and therefore the
owner is not held up.































Figure 2 Proposition 4 There exist α, β and β = e β (α), where e β
0
(α) > 0, such that
the optimal ownership structure is:
(i) nonintegration (with specialization and general technology) if and only
if β ≤ e β (α) and β ≤ β.
(ii) integration (with rotation and speci￿c technology) if and only if β>
e β (α) and α ≤ α.
(iii) nonintegration or integration (with specialization and speci￿ct e c h -
nology) if and only if α>α and β>β.
Focus (specialization and speci￿c technology) improves productivity but
leads to dependency. The agents may choose rotation or general technology
to improve their bargaining positions.
If both α and β are very large, the agents will implement both special-
ization and speci￿c technology ￿ even it means that the agents are fully
dependent on each other. Whatever the ownership structure the agents can
realize the value of their human capital only by working together and holdup
problems are maximal. But the returns to specialization and speci￿ct e c h -
nology are so signi￿cant that they outweigh the holdup problems.
When either α or β is not very large organization is designed so that at
least one agent has power. Suppose agent 1 owns both assets. Agent 1 can
improve her bargaining position by choosing rotation. General technology
on the other hand does not increase bargaining power under integration.
Gearing internal assets to each other does not make the owner vulnerable
and accordingly speci￿c technology is chosen under integration. Therefore
the relevant structure for integration is rotation and speci￿c technology.
Then suppose the assets are nonintegrated. General technology allows the
agents to be fully independent and the holdup problem is removed. Rotation
on the other hand does not increase bargaining power under nonintegration.
Specialization does not make the owner dependent on the other agent and
accordingly under nonintegration specialization is chosen. Therefore special-
ization and general technology will be chosen under nonintegration.
If either α or β is bounded the agents will implement either specialization
or speci￿c technology but not both. Nonintegration gives good incentives for
task allocation but poor incentives for technology choice. Integration has
the opposite properties and gives good incentives for technology choice but
poor incentives for task allocation. The optimal ownership structure depends
on whether it is more important to achieve focus in human capital or in
22technology. If α/β is small it is important that the speci￿c technology is
chosen. Integration is then optimal. While for large α/β the agents should
specialize. Accordingly, the agents contract on nonintegration.
The irrelevance of the ownership structure in the parameter range where
both α and β are very large results from our assumptions. Ownership
would matter if we assume that the skills are somewhat transferable. Then
even with specialization the agent could operate the second asset to some
degree (v1 (1,{a1,a 2};α,β) > v1 (1,{a1};α,β)). Transferable skills improve
the owner￿s bargaining position under integration and accordingly integra-
tion is optimal. Alternatively, if the speci￿c technology allows some trade
with other ￿rms
¡
vi (i,{ai};α,β) > 0
¢
the bargaining positions are improved
under nonintegration and nonintegration dominates.
7 Choice of technology
We ￿nally analyze the case where the agents can choose the technology but
the organizational design is given. This is relevant when the tasks are so
similar that the skills are fully transferable (e.g. operating two similar weld-
ing machines). Then specialization does not give power. Alternatively the
tasks are so diﬀerent that it is not feasible for one worker to acquire both
skills (e.g. an engineering and a legal task ). In both cases the agents always
specialize but they may still be able to choose the technology.
We analyze this case so that we can ￿nd the general message from our
three cases. On their own the results of this section are well-known (Riordan
and Williamson (1985)).
With a general technology the value of production is f (S,A) where
fi(i,{ai})=fi (12,{a1,a 2}). While a speci￿c technology gives value F (S,A;β)
where Fi (i,{ai};β)=0 . We assume that ∂F (S,A;β)/∂β > 0 and f (S,A)=
F (S,A;β) if and only if β =1 . Both functions are also assumed to ful￿ll
Assumptions 6-11.





i (12,{a1,a 2};β) − c
0 (Ii)=0 i =1 ,2 (28)
Holdup problem is maximal because the assets, and the ￿rms, are fully de-
pendent on each other.
23General technology results in the following incentives:
f
i (12,{a1,a 2}) − c
0(Ii)=0 i =1 ,2 (29)
The agents have no power over each other as there are many equally good
trading partners.
When agent 1 owns both assets which have the speci￿c technology invest-













2 (12,{a1,a 2};β) − c
0(I2)=0 (31)
For the general technology equations (30) and (31) apply with β set equal
to one. General technology does not improve bargaining positions under
integration. Therefore speci￿c technology is chosen under integration.
It is easy to see from (28), (30) and (31) that given the speci￿ct e c h n o l o g y
integration dominates as agent 1 has better incentives under integration and
agent 2 has no worse incentives. We therefore compare nonintegration and
general technology with integration and speci￿c technology to determine the
optimal ownership structure.
Proposition 5 There exists β
∗ such that the optimal ownership structure is
(i) nonintegration (and general technology) if and only if β ≤ β
∗,
(ii) integration (and speci￿c technology) if and only if β>β
∗.
Proof. For β =1JNI,G >J I,S and for β →∞JNI,G <J I,S. By continuity
there exists β
∗ for which JNI,G ≥ JI,S if and only if β ≤ β
∗.
The tradeoﬀ is by now familiar. Under nonintegration the agents choose
the ineﬃcient general technology to improve their bargaining positions and
in fact remove the holdup problem. Under integration the eﬃcient speci￿c
technology is chosen but the agents are subject to holdups. If the speci￿c
technology is much more productive than the general one, integration is
optimal.
248G e n e r a l m e s s a g e
We have analyzed three versions of the model and in this section we examine
the general message emerging from the analysis. In all the versions we ob-
serve speci￿c technology under integration (Propositions 4 and 5). In other
words holdup problem in technology choice disappears under integration. It
is interesting to relate this result to earlier literature. Hart (1995, 27-28) dis-
cusses the transaction cost theory of Williamson (1975), (1985) and Klein et
al. (1978) and points out that this literature is unclear about the way holdup
behavior is reduced in a single ￿rm. Hart writes that it is unsatisfactory to
suppose that the agents automatically become less opportunistic as a result
of merger. Now it is important to use Williamson￿s classi￿cation of asset spe-
ci￿c investments: site-speci￿c investment, speci￿c physical investment and
speci￿c investment in human capital. Hart analyzes investments in speci￿c
human capital and then indeed the holdup behavior does not disappear in
the integrated ￿rm, it just changes. A lot of Williamson￿s analysis is about
site-speci￿c investments and speci￿c physical investments. For these types of
investments holdup problem disappears in the integrated ￿rm, not because
opportunism is reduced but because choosing speci￿c technology does not
make the owner vulnerable as he owns both assets.15
The second message relates to human capital. We observe specialization
with nonintegration in all the versions of the model (Propositions 3 and 4).
In other words the skills are focused inside the ￿rm. In this model the
agents never learn skills outside the focus of the ￿rm. Our model analyzes
only asset-speci￿c investments, i.e. vi (i,∅)=0 . If we included investments
in outside skills in our analysis we would ￿nd that the non-owning agent
would invest in skills that improve his default payoﬀ v (i,∅), i.e. in skills
outside the focus of the ￿rm. However, the owner always focuses his skills
inside the ￿rm. The owner of the integrated ￿rm can improve his bargaining
position, v(1,{a1,a 2}), by rotating between internal tasks, not by learning
o u t s i d es k i l l s . ( T h i si st r u ee v e ni fw eh a v em o r ea s s e t sa n da g e n t si nt h e
model.) The owner of the nonintegrated ￿rm can improve his default payoﬀ
15In Proposition 4(iii) where both α and β are high speci￿c technology does make the
owner vulnerable due to specialization but the returns are so high that they outweigh
the holdup problem. The point is that general technology is never chosen in equilibrium
under integration. Therefore the holdup problem in technology choice i sr e m o v e di nt h e
integrated ￿rm.
25v(i,{ai}) by choosing a general technology, again not by learning outside
skills. Accordingly, ownership gives the incentives to focus on the ￿rm. One
implication of this result is that if it is crucial for a particular agent to
concentrate their human capital on the ￿rm, he should be the owner of the
￿rm.
9 Asymmetric task allocation
In the main model task allocation is symmetric. This is relevant when the
assets are such that only one agent can work at an asset at a time and the
assets are fully utilized. If we allow for asymmetric task allocation, it would
dominate full rotation under integration. The owner would rotate and the
worker would specialize.16 Rotation improves the owner￿s bargaining position
as the worker is not important at the margin. Rotation by the worker does
not improve the worker￿s incentives at all since he is in any case dependent
on the owner to gain access to the asset.
The situation changes when we have 3 agents. To simplify notation sup-
pose there is one asset, a, and agent 1 owns the asset. Shapley value gives
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v (i,∅) − c(Ii) (33)




























0 (Ii) i =2 ,3 (35)
If there are three tasks and all the agents learn all the tasks, equations (34)








0 (Ii) i =2 ,3 (37)
Rotation by the owner again removes the holdup problem for her. What
is new is that rotation improves the workers￿ incentives too. Workers cannot
hold up each other because they all have the same skills. Therefore rotation
can reduce power problems not just for the owner but among the workers
too. Asymmetric task allocation, accordingly, does not dominate full rotation
under integration.
10 Noncontractible organizational design and
technology
In the main model we have assumed that organizational design and technol-
ogy are contractible. Therefore the ex ante contract on ownership structure
determines also the organizational design and technology. In this section we
show that our results are robust to this assumption. The driving force in our
model is the noncontractible human capital.
Suppose organizational design and technology are noncontractible and the
owner has the right to choose them. The natural timing is after the contract
on ownership has been written but before the investments in human capital
are made. The owner chooses them to maximize his own payoﬀ, not the joint
surplus. How does this aﬀect our results? Let us take Proposition 5 which
states that nonintegration and general technology maximize joint surplus if
and only if β ≤ β
∗. To verify that nonintegration is still optimal for β ≤ β
∗ we
need to prove that the owner of the nonintegrated ￿rm would choose general
technology for β ≤ β
∗ and the owner of the integrated ￿rm would choose
speci￿c technology for β>β
∗. We know from our previous analysis that
the owner of the integrated ￿rm always chooses speci￿c technology because
it does not increase vulnerability. Now Proposition 5 holds as long as the
27owners of the nonintegrated ￿rms would indeed choose general technology





i if β ≤ β
∗. In what follows we prove that this
is true.
First note that JI,S >J NI,S for all β as stated in Section 7. Second,
Proposition 5 obtains that JI,S ≤ JNI,G if and only if β ≤ β
∗. Third, since the
agents are identical we have JNI,S =2 P
NI,S
i and JNI,G =2 P
NI,G
i . Combining
these all we have JNI,G =2 P
NI,G
i ≥ JI,S >J NI,S =2 P
NI,S






i for β ≤ β
∗. Therefore the owner chooses general
technology under nonintegration for β ≤ β
∗. Accordingly Proposition 5 holds
also with noncontractible technology.
Then we analyze noncontractible organizational design. Proposition 3
states that integration and rotation maximize joint surplus if and only if α<
e α while nonintegration and specialization are joint surplus maximizing for
α ≥ e α. We know that specialization is always chosen under nonintegration.
To ￿nd out whether Proposition 3 is robust to noncontractible organizational
design we examine if the owner of the integrated ￿rm chooses rotation for
α<e α. We analyze this question in Figures 3 and 4. The solid line in the
￿gures represents the critical boundary e α(µ). Below the solid line integra-
tion and rotation maximize joint surplus while above it nonintegration and
specialization are joint surplus maximizing.





1 . The two possibilities for this critical boundary are presented in Figures
3a n d4a sb r o k e nl i n e s . 17 Below the broken line the owner of the integrated
￿rm chooses rotation. If the critical boundary lies above e α,a si nF i g u r e
3, then Proposition 3 does not change at all. The owner indeed chooses
rotation for α<e α. While in the situation of Figure 4 in region A the owner
of the integrated ￿rm would choose specialization. Therefore the critical
boundary between integration and nonintegration shifts and becomes the
thick line. Although the critical boundary shifts, the basic tradeoﬀ is not
changed: nonintegration emerges for high α and high µ.
11 Conclusions
We have analyzed three versions of our basic model. In the ￿rst version we
endogenize organizational design in the property rights theory of Hart and
17See Appendix for how the ￿gures were constructed.
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  Moore (1990). In our model with two agents and two assets the agents can
either specialize in operating one asset or rotate between the assets. Spe-
cialization increases productivity but (depending on the ownership structure)
also increases holdup problems because a specialized agent is indispensable.
Hart and Moore (1990) show that when an agent is indispensable to an
asset, it is optimal for him to own it. Our analysis broadly con￿rms this cor-
relation18 but changes the causal relationship. It is not because the agent is
indispensable that he owns the asset but ownership gives the agent incentives
to become indispensable.
It is well known that strong joint economies make integration optimal.
What we are adding is that it comes at the cost of ineﬃcient organizational
design. Under integration the worker is not allowed to obtain the power
that specialization gives him; the agents rotate. While under nonintegration
each agent is a boss of his own and specialization does not cause power
problems; the agents specialize. Therefore nonintegration is optimal when
the returns to specialization are high (the cost of ineﬃcient organizational
design under integration is high) and the joint economies are weak (holdup
problems arising from separating the assets are low).
In the second version of the model we further endogenize the technology
choice and analyze its interaction with organizational design. The agents
can choose between a general and a speci￿c technology. Speci￿c technol-
ogy is more productive but (depending on the ownership structure) increases
holdup problems because the assets can only be used together. Under inte-
gration speci￿c technology does not increase holdup problems because both
assets have the same owner. Therefore a speci￿c technology is chosen un-
der integration. While under nonintegration (for a wide parameter range)
the agents improve their bargaining position by minimizing dependency and
choose a general technology. We are particularly interested in how the tech-
nology choice interacts with organizational design.
We ￿nd that when both the returns to specialization, α, and the returns
to speci￿c technology, β, are large the agents choose both specialization and
speci￿c technology even it leads to maximal holdup problems. The agents
are completely dependent on each other whatever the ownership structure
but the returns to specialization and to speci￿c technology are so large that
they outweigh the power problems. While when either α or β is bounded
the agents design the organization so that at least one agent has power.
18It is violated in Proposition 4(iii).
29The agents implement either specialization or speci￿c technology but not
both. For high α/β t h ea g e n t sc h o o s ea no w n e r s h i ps t r u c t u r et oe n s u r e
specialization. Thus nonintegration is optimal. While for low α/β it is
important to implement the speci￿c technology and therefore integration
is optimal. The ownership structure is chosen so that it gives appropriate
incentives for organizational design and technology choice.
In the third version of the model only technology choice is endogenous.
We ￿nd that when the returns to the speci￿c technology are high, integration
is optimal. While for low β nonintegration is chosen. This is not a novel result
but we have included it in the paper so that we can ￿nd a general message
from the three versions of the model.
There are two results that arise in all three versions of the model. The
￿rst general message of this paper is that speci￿c technology is chosen under
integration. The second general message is that ownership gives the incen-
tives to focus human capital on the ￿rm.
There are other dimensions to organizational design and technology than
those analyzed here. Their eﬀect on power relationships inside and between
the ￿rms remains an open question.
Trust is important in relationships where dependency leads to vulnera-
bility. In the future it is interesting to explore how building and maintaining
trust interacts with organizational design, choice of technology and owner-
ship.
30A Appendix
In this Appendix we analyze the case where both technology and organiza-
tional design are endogenous (Section 6).
A.1 Integration
We will ￿rst analyze the incentives to invest when agent 1 owns both assets.
Since we have two technologies and two organizational designs we have four
possible combinations and we analyze each in turn.





i (12,{a1,a 2};α,β) − c
0 (Ii)=0 for i =1 ,2 (38)
v1 (1,{a1,a 2};α,β)=v1 (1,{a1};α,β) because the agents have specialized
and v1 (1,{a1};α,β)=0since the assets have the speci￿c technology. The
owner does not have any power because she only knows how to operate
one asset (specialization) and one asset is useless without the other (speci￿c
technology). Therefore both agents are subject to a maximal holdup. On
the other hand, given investments have the maximal value arising from the
returns to specialization and the value of the speci￿c technology.
Under specialization and general technology (SG) the incentives are:
e v





2 (12,{a1,a 2};α) − c
0 (I2)=0 (40)
The owner is not subject to a holdup with a general technology. e v1 (1,{a1,a 2};α)=
e v1 (1,{a1};α) due to specialization and e v1 (1,{a1};α)=e v1 (12,{a1,a 2};α)
with the general technology. Specialization does not give any power the
worker because the assets (and the tasks) are independent.
With rotation and speci￿c technology (RS) the ￿rst-order conditions be-
come:
b v





2 (12,{a1,a 2};β) − c
0 (I2)=0 (42)
With rotation b v1 (1,{a1,a 2};β)=b v1 (12,{a1,a 2};β) and the owner receives
the full marginal value of her investment. Worker does not have any power
because the owner has similar skills.
Finally, with rotation and general technology (RG) the incentives are:
v





2 (12,{a1,a 2}) − c
0 (I2)=0 (44)
The owner is not subject to a holdup because rotation makes the worker
dispensable.
RG is clearly dominated by SG and RS. The owner is not subject to a
holdup problem in any of these structures and in RG both the task allocation
and the technology are ineﬃcient.
The agents will choose between SS, SG and RS. Under SS the owner has
no power but both the organizational design and the technology are eﬃcient.
With SG and RS the owner has power but either the task allocation or the
technology is ineﬃcient. We will analyze these choices in detail in Section
A.3.
A.2 Nonintegration
In this subsection we examine how the incentives under nonintegration de-
pend on the technology and organizational design.




i(12,{a1,a 2};α,β) − c
0 (Ii)=0 for i =1 ,2 (45)
With speci￿c technology vi (i,{ai};α,β)=0 . Ownership does not give any
power to the agents because the assets are fully dependent on each other.
The holdup problem is maximal.
When the general technology is chosen e vi (i,{ai};α)=e vi(12,{a1,a 2};α).
T h e r e f o r eu n d e rS Gw eh a v e :
e v
i (12,{a1,a 2};α) − c
0(Ii)=0 for i =1 ,2 (46)
32The agents have no power over each other as there are many equally good
alternative trading partners.




i (12,{a1,a 2};β) − c
0 (Ii)=0 for i =1 ,2 (47)
Because of speci￿c technology the agents have no alternative trading partner
and are subject to maximal holdup. This structure is dominated by SS.
The agents have no power in either structure but under SS task allocation is
eﬃcient.
Finally under RG vi (i,{ai})=vi (12,{a1,a 2}) due to the general tech-
nology and the incentives are:
v
i (12,{a1,a 2}) − c
0 (Ii)=0 for i =1 ,2 (48)
The agents are not subject to a holdup problem because the assets are tech-
nologically independent. SG dominates RG since in both structures there
are no holdup problems and under SG the task allocation is eﬃcient.
The relevant structures are SS and SG. Rotation is not chosen under
nonintegration. Rotation does not improve the agents￿ bargaining positions.
The power relationship depends only on the technology choice. The speci￿c
technology makes the agents dependent on each other but gives higher value
for given investments. The general technology removes power problems but
given investments have lower value.
A.3 Optimal ownership structure
We start by comparing the ownership structures for a given choice of technol-
ogy and task allocation. Then we determine the optimal ownership structure.
RG is dominated under both integration and nonintegration. Accordingly
RG does not arise in equilibrium. Under SS the ownership structures are
equivalent ((38) vs. (45)). Neither agent has any power.
Under SG nonintegration dominates integration ((39) and (40) vs. (46)).
General technology removes the holdup problem under nonintegration while
under integration the worker is subject to a holdup.
For RS integration generates a higher surplus ((41) and (42) vs. (47)).
Because of the speci￿c technology the agents have no power under noninte-
gration while rotation removes the owner￿s holdup problem under integration.
33Therefore the relevant structures are:





i(12,{a1,a 2};α,β) − c
0 (Ii)=0 for i =1 ,2 (49)
(ii) specialization and general technology under nonintegration
e v
i (12,{a1,a 2};α) − c
0(Ii)=0 for i =1 ,2 (50)
(iii) rotation and speci￿c technology under integration
b v





2 (12,{a1,a 2};β) − c
0 (I2)=0 (52)
Proof of Proposition 4. Compare ￿rst SS and nonintegration with SG
((49) vs. (50)). For β =1nonintegration dominates and JSS <J NI,SG.
For β →∞clearly JSS >J NI,SG. By continuity there exists β for which
JSS >J NI,SG if and only if β>β.
Then compare SS with integration under RS ((49) vs. (51) and (52)).
For α =1JI,RS >J SS and for α →∞JI,RS <J SS. By continuity there
exists α for which JI,RS <J SS if and only if α>α.
Next we divide the parameter space into four regions.
(i) α>α and β>β. We have found that JSS >J NI,SG and JSS >J I,RS.
Therefore SS is optimal in this region.
(ii) α ≤ α and β>β. In this region JI,RS ≥ JSS >J NI,SG and integra-
tion is optimal.
(iii) α>α and β ≤ β.We have JNI,SG ≥ JSS >J I,RS and nonintegration
is optimal.
(iv) α ≤ α and β ≤ β. We have shown that JI,RS ≥ JSS and JNI,SG ≥
JSS. We still need to compare integration and nonintegration to ￿nd out the
optimal structure ((50) vs. (51) and (52)).
For α = β =1JNI,SG >J I,RS. While for α =1and β →∞JNI,SG <
JI,RS. Therefore there exists β
0 for which JNI,SG = JI,RS at α =1 . (See
Figure 2.) We further know that β
0 < β since for α =1and β>βJ I,RS >
JNI,SG.
34The next step is to prove that the slope of the critical boundary between
nonintegration with SG and integration with RS is positive. Since ∂JNI,SG
∂α >
0, ∂JNI,SG
∂β =0 , ∂JI,RS
∂α =0and ∂JI,RS
∂β > 0 clearly the value of β for which
JNI,SG = JI,RS is increasing in α.
Finally, we show that this critical boundary ends at α = α and β = β.
Suppose it does not. The two possibilities are presented in Figure 5. Here
we draw the critical boundary between nonintegration and integration for all
values of α and β. First consider the lower curve. In area A according to
this ￿gure JI,RS >J NI,SG but this cannot be true since we know that for
α>α and β ≤ βJ NI,SG >J I,RS. Now consider the higher curve. In area
B according to this ￿gure JI,RS <J NI,SG but this cannot be true since for






T os u mu pw eh a v ep r o v e dt h a tJNI,SG = JI,RS maps a function β = e β (α)
such that e β (1) = β
0, e β (α)=β and e β
0
(α) > 0.
Therefore the optimal ownership structure is:
(i) Nonintegration with SG if and only if β ≤ e β (α) and β ≤ β.
(ii) I n t e g r a t i o nw i t hR Si fa n do n l yi fβ>e β (α) and α ≤ α.
(iii) SS if and only if α>α and β>β.
A . 4 C o n s t r u c t i n gF i g u r e s3a n d4
The solid line in Figures 3 and 4 shows the critical boundary e α(µ) derived
in Proposition 3. From the proof of the Proposition we know that the critical
boundary between integration with rotation and nonintegration with special-
ization cuts the vertical axis at µ0, where 0 <µ 0 < 1, a n dt h a ti ti sd o w n w a r d
sloping.
The broken line is the critical boundary for the owner of the integrated
￿rm when organizational design in noncontractible. Above it the owner
chooses specialization and below it rotation. Denote this critical boundary
by α = α(µ). We will ￿rst prove that α0 (µ) < 0.


































































∂α > 0 from equation (12) and therefore the owner￿s payoﬀ under special-
ization is increasing in α.




















V (1,{a1,a 2};α) > 0 (53)
The worker￿s investment does not depend on the degree of joint economies
(equation (12)). Therefore there is only the direct eﬀect. The only term that
is changed in the payoﬀ function is V (1,{a1,a 2};α) because when agent 1
is on her own the assets are separated in a sense since she only knows how
to operate one asset. The higher is the degree of joint economies (the lower






















function α = α(µ) such that α0 (µ) < 0.
We ￿nally prove that α(1) = 1. Suppose α = µ =1 . From equations
(12) and (15) we see that agent 2￿s investment is the same with rotation or
specialization. Equations (11) and (14) show that agent 1￿s investments are
the same too. Since for α =1t h ev a l u ef u n c t i o n sa r et h es a m e ,t h eo w n e r
must be indiﬀerent between specialization and rotation when α = µ =1 .
Therefore this critical boundary cuts the vertical axis at µ =1 , above µ0.
Accordingly the two possibilities for this critical boundary are presented in
Figures 3 and 4.
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